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UPDATING THE TRUST INDENTURE ACT
Howard M. Friedman*
Holders of publicly distributed debt securities are, in essence, parties
to contracts of adhesion. There is no opportunity for a purchaser of a debt
security to negotiate the terms of his loan to the issuer. In addition, because there are a large number of geographically scattered small lenders,
each of them is placed in a particularly vulnerable position. While lenders
traditionally have numerous methods of protecting their interests, creditor protection is ineffective unless responsibility for enforcement is centralized. Widely scattered security holders find it difficult to police compliance with convenants in the loan agreement and to coordinate legal action in case of default. Therefore, the debt holders' interests are generally
represented by a trustee who is given the responsibility of enforcing the
loan provisions (and any related mortgage provisions) that are embodied
in the indenture under which the securities are issued.'
The Trust Indenture Act of 19392 (Act) was directed toward assuring
to holders of debt securities the services of a disinterested indenture trustee," who would observe high standards of conduct in protecting their interests. 4 Without this protection, other creditors and stockholders represented by management often could obtain unfair advantage upon the
:.:
Associate Professor of Law, University of Toledo College of Law. B.A., 1962,
Ohio State University: J.D., 1965. Harvard University; LL.M., 1967, Georgetown
University.
I The earliest function of the trustee under an indenture was that of serving as the
transferee of the property conveyed as collateral to secure the rights of scattered
bondholders. For a discussion of the trustee's functions and the general development
of the trust indenture see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, COMMENTARIES ON IDENTURES 4-10 (1971) [hereinafter cited as ABF COMMENTARIES].
2 15 U.S.C. § 77 aaa et seq. (1970).
3 While the Act is somewhat awkwardly drafted for this purpose, it presumably
requires the use of a trustee whenever bonds, notes, debentures, or other evidences of
indebtedness are issued in an amount totaling over $250,000 in any twelve-month
period. Trust Indenture Act § 304(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(8) (1970). Issues over
$250,000 must be issued under an indenture. Id. Presumably implicit in the indenture
requirement is that the indenture provide for a trustee, although the Act never specifies this, for indentures which need not otherwise comply with the substantive provisions of the Act, even in § 303(7), the definitional provision of "indenture." 15 U.S.C.
§ 77ccc(7) (1970). If the total amount of securities that may be outstanding under the
indenture is more than one million dollars, the indenture must comply with the other
provisions of the Act. Trust Indenture Act § 304(a)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(9) (1970).
One of these provisions specifies that a trustee be used. Trust Indenture Act §
310(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(a)(l) (1970). See also 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION
746-47 (1961).
4 This purpose was indicated not only in the legislative history, see H.R. REP. No.
1016, 76th Cong., IstSess. 25 (1939), but was also spelled out in the Act itself. Trust
Indenture Act § 302(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb(a) (1970). See also Note, The Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 25 CORNELL L.Q. 105 (1939).
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insolvency of a corporate issuer of debt securities. Creditors junior to the
public debt security holders might take steps to collect, or at least to collateralize, their advances.5 Incumbent management might structure the
reorganization, which would occur after a default, so as to retain substantial control. 6 And often, as the history of the early part of the twentieth
century shows, the indenture trustee, supposedly acting on behalf of the
bondholders, either would itself be a junior creditor or shareholder, or
would be allied with other junior creditors or shareholders who were at7
tempting to obtain advantages.
In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress perceived its first problem as one of restoring confidence in the securities industry. It then focused specifically on the problems facing security holders, particularly
debt security holders, after the issuer's default. Section 2110 of the Securities Exchange Act of 193410 directed the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) to make a study of reorganizations and liquidations of
insolvent corporations, with particular reference to the activities of protective and reorganization committees. 1 Out of this study came both the
Trust Indenture Act, and Chapter X' 2 of the Bankruptcy Act, which
was added by the Chandler Act in 1938.13 Both pieces of legislation

were largely concerned with post-default problems.
In hindsight, the drafters of the Trust Indenture Act appear to have
been wearing blinders. Their concern with protecting bondholders led
them to ignore the broader impact of the Act upon the securities markets.
Having dealt with the misuse of inside information in 1934,14 Congress
promptly forgot about it in the context of the 1939 Act.

5 SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES,
PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, Pt.

VI at 80-109 (1936) [hereinafter cited as VI SEC 1936

REPORT].

6 1 J. MOORE & R. OGLEBAY, CORPORATE REORGANIZATION
7 See note 5 supra.

1973-75 (1948).

8 See V. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA 352-53

(1970).
9 15 U.S.C. § 78jj (1970).
10 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. (1970).
11 The work of protective and reorganization committees has been described as
follows:
The functions of the bondholders' protective committee in this context
are to prepare a plan of reorganization and to obtain the security holders' assents to the plan. When, pursuant to the decree of the court, the
foreclosure sale is held, the committee proceeds to bid in the property,
applying, in payment of most of the purchase price, the bonds which
have been deposited with it. Then, freed of creditors' claims by the sale,
the debtor's assets are enveloped in a new corporate shell, and subjected to the new financial structure designated in the reorganization
plan; and the securities representative of this new structure are issued
to those who have assented to the plan of reorganization.
SEC, REPORT ON THE STUDY AND INVESTIGATION OF THE WORK, ACTIVITIES, PERSONNEL, AND FUNCTIONS OF PROTECTIVE AND REORGANIZATION COMMITTEES, pt. VIII
at 15 (1940) (footnotes omitted).
12 11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1970).
13 See 2 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 719-20 (1961).
14 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 10(b), 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78(p)
(1970).
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Since 1939, however, problems of misuse of inside information have
come to the fore, as have related concerns regarding the role of institutional investors in our economy. Despite these changes in attitude, the
question of the continuing adequacy of the Trust Indenture Act's provisions has been virtually ignored. The two most ambitious and recent studies that might have explored the question failed to do so. Neither the
SEC's Institutional Investor Study,' 5 nor the Report of the President's
Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation (the Hunt Commission
report) 16 touched on the problem, even though both extensively discussed
bank personal trust departments.' 7 The American Law Institute's project
to draft a Federal Securities Code will contain a portion relating to trust
indentures; however, a draft of this part has not yet been publicly released. Nevertheless, the Reporter's Introductory Memorandum to Tentative Draft No. 2 of the Federal Securities Code states that "little substantive change is envisaged" with respect to that part of the Federal Securities Code."'
It is difficult to explain the continuing failure to reexamine the Trust
Indenture Act. In part, the lack of concern may be due to the general
economic prosperity that has existed since World War II. This period of
prosperity has minimized the number of situations in which public holders
of debt securities have been adversely affected by corporate insolvency.'
Since the Act generally is directed toward concerns that arise upon default
by the obligor, it is only upon insolvency that the Act's provisions become
of crucial importance. Second, the complexity of the Act has led to a
channeling of efforts in directions other than toward a wholesale examination of the bases upon which the Act rests. For example, the American Bar Foundation (ABF) has completed its ambitious Corporate Debt
Financing Project that prepared model provisions for indentures, including
boilerplate developed to comply with the Act's requirements.2 0 While the
ABF Project has simplified the drafting of enormously complex documents, it has failed to further any critical evaluation of the adequacy of
21
existing controls.
15 SEC INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971) [hereinafter cited as INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY].
16 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION

(1971).
17 INSTITUTIONAL

INVESTOR STUDY,

supra note 15, at 413-94;

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE AND REGULATION,

REPORT

OF THE

supra note 16, at

101-06.
18 ALl FED. SECURITIES CODE xiii-xv (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1973).
19Johnson, Default Administration of Corporate Trust Indentures: The General
Nature of the Trustee's Responsibility and Events of Default, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J.
203, 203-04 (1970).
20 See ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 1.
21 Indeed, in describing the project, its editors said:
In order to achieve maximum standardization and general adaptability,
the Project sought first to determine what provisions are practically
"non-negotiable," not in the sense that they cannot be negotiated, but
in the sense that they seldom are in fact negotiated and as a practical
matter in most cases ought not to be.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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Whatever may be the reasons for the lack of interest in the Trust Indenture Act, the disregard cannot be attributed to the disappearance of
the problems that the Act was designed to remedy. Today widely scattered holders of debt securities face the same hurdles in enforcing indenture provisions that existed in 1939. The need for disinterested and responsible indenture trustees is as great as ever, and, as indentures for
corporate organizations contain increasingly complex covenants to protect
the holders of securities under the indentures, the need for sophisticated
and active trustees increases. 2 2 Moreover, despite the development of
other remedial and protective provisions of the federal securities laws in
recent years,23 the kinds of problems at which the Trust Indenture Act
was directed have not been adequately treated.
The Trust Indenture Act's thrust, which is largely prophylactic, is to
ensure the presence of a trustee with adequate power and responsibility
to protect holders of securities under the indenture. Thus, while the recent
decision in Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co.2 4 held that a rule
1Ob-525 action is available to purchasers and holders of debentures who
allege a plan or scheme between the issuer, its accountants, and the indenture trustee to submit false asset valuations in order to satisfy certain
covenants in the trust indenture, such an action is at best an after-thefact remedy. The failure of the Trust Indenture Act to protect against
the activities alleged in Lewis and related cases involving Webb & Knapp
debentures 26 gives rise to concern that the Act needs reform in order to
achieve its purposes.
I. PURPOSES OF THE ACT

A. Conflicts of Interest
One of the important purposes of the Trust Indenture Act was an attempt to eliminate conflicting interests that might lead the trustee to disregard his duty to bond or debenture holders. The history of the Act
shows that its drafters were primarily concerned with conflicts of interest
existing when the trustee either is allied with junior securiy holders or is
itself a short-term lender.2 7 In either case the trustee has incentives to
delay notice of defaults by the obligor and to postpone foreclosures on
behalf of the bondholders, in order to protect junior or unsecured inter22 For an example of early covenants drafted in a manner that permitted easy
evasion, see the negative pledge clauses described in VI SEC 1936 REPORT, supra
note 5, at 10-16. Compare the clauses in ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at
349-67.
23 Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973) under the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (1970) et seq., has increasingly been used as a remedy for
wrongdoing in the securities area. One writer has referred to the use of this remedy
as an "apparently relentless broadening of the scope of possible recovery." Posner,
Developments in Federal Securities Regulation, 29 Bus. LAWYER 3, 21 (1973).
24 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,206 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 7, 1973).
25 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1973).
26 See note 108 and accompanying text infra.
27 VI SEC 1936 REPORT,supra note 5, at 71-109.
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ests. Any delay makes it possible for junior creditors, stockholders, and
insiders to siphon off assets ahead of senior debt holders or, at a minimum, to form and control the reorganization committee, which dominates
reorganization proceedings after insolvency becomes apparent. '
An example of the problem is the case of R. H. Hoe & Co., Inc.,
described by the SEC in its 1936 report. 2 1" Guaranty Trust Company was
trustee for the bonds of Hoe, a manufacturer of printing presses. Officers
of an affiliate of Guaranty Trust knew of an impending default, but did
not inform the bondholders even after the default occurred. Guaranty had
numerous other relationships with Hoe: it was a creditor of Hoe; its securities affiliate was an underwriter of Hoe securities; and it was in control of Hoe through both common stock ownership and control of the trustees of a voting trust. When it became clear that a default would occur,
Guaranty began to take steps to ensure that it would control the reorganization that would certainly follow. Through such control, Guaranty could
protect itself from losses due to its other relationships with Hoe.
Even before default, however, Guaranty was in a position to benefit
itself at the expense of bondholders. Guaranty earlier had loaned
$1,700,000 to Hoe. When it appeared that Hoe was in financial difficulty,
Guaranty began to do two things: first, it applied the proceeds of collateral to reduce the amount owed to it by Hoe; second, through its control
of Hoe's board of directors, it modified the loan agreement to increase the
collateral pledged to secure the loan by ending Hoe's right to withdraw
collateral in excess of 120 percent of the loan. If Hoe had been able to
continue the withdrawal of excess collateral, additional assets would have
been available to satisfy bondholders. In addition, Guaranty applied Hoe's
checking account balance to the outstanding loan, and seized funds that
Guaranty held as paying agent for the bonds for which it was also trustee.'"
To combat problems such as these, the Act, in Section 310(b), ' sets
up elaborate provisions for disqualification of a trustee with conflicting
interests. These provisions must be included in all indentures covered by
the Act.
1. In General: Section 310(b)-If the trustee has or acquires a conflicting interest, he must either eliminate the conflicting interest or resign
within ninety days after discovering the conflict. If the trustee fails to
take either of these steps, he must notify the bond or debenture holders
of his failure to resign, and any person who has been a bona fide holder
of the indenture securities for six months may obtain court removal of the
32
trustee and appointment of a successor.
In nine paragraphs, the Act specifies in meticulous detail the conditions
under which a trustee is deemed to have a conflict of interest.

28
29
30
31

32

Id.
Id. at 39-42, 83-88.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b) (1970).

Id.
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a. Dual Trusteeship.'13-A conflict exists if the indenture trustee is also
a trustee under another indenture covering securities of the same obligor.
This provision, however, exempts dual trusteeships where no conflict of
interest is likely to exist-. The first of these exemptions is the situation in
which the trusteeship under an indenture for collateral trust notes is coupled with a trusteeship under an indenture for securities that are the only
collateral for the collateral trust notes. 34 Here, presumably, the security
holders under both indentures have identical interests, since the value of
the collateral trust notes is solely dependent upon the value of the collateral securities.
The second exemption from the dual trusteeship prohibition is for dual
indentures covering obligations of real estate companies where the obligor has no substantial unmortgaged assets, and each indenture is secured
by wholly separate parcels of real estate. In this case there is presumably
no conflict of interest because all of the issues under each indenture are
equally and separately secured, and no unsecured assets are available to
be siphoned off by one set of creditors."- In addition, any attempts to
invade the collateral of other bondholders is prevented by the probable
presence of state statutes enabling recordation of mortgage interests in
real property.
An exemption may also be obtained if the indenture itself excludes
another specifically described indenture from the operation of the disqualification provisions, as long as both indentures are wholly unsecured.
However, the SEC may prohibit such a dual trusteeship if it formally finds
that the differences between the two indentures make a material conflict
of interest likely to exist.
Finally, even if none of the exemptions from the dual trusteeship provisions apply, a dual trusteeship may be permitted if the issuer proves, in
proceedings before the SEC, that no material conflict of interest is likely
to exist.
b. The Trustee as an Obligor or Underwriter:"--The Act specifies
that a conflict exists if the trustee or any of its directors or executive officers is either an obligor on the indenture securities or an underwriter for
such an obligor. Where the trustee or principals of the trustee are also the
obligor, the conflict is clear: the trustee is both a debtor and a trustee of
the creditors, who are holders of the securities. Where the trustee is an
underwriter, a similar conflict exists. The underwriter generally has close
ties to the management of the issuer. Or, the underwriter may be a mar
ket maker for the issuer's stock and may desire to reduce its position, by
37
selling off its stock holdings, before defaults by an obligor are disclosed.
The provisions of the Banking Act of 1933, which require separation of
33 Trust Indenture Act § 310(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(1) (1970).
34 Collateral trust notes are debt obligations that are secured by a lien on other

securities which have been deposited with a trustee as collateral. See I A.
THE FINANCIAL POLICY OF CORPORATIONS 210-14 (5th ed. 1953).
35 Cf. VI SEC 1936 REPORT, supra note 5, at 32-33, 103-09.
36 Trust Indenture Act § 310(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(2) (1970).
37 VI SEC 1936 REPORT, supra note 5, at 103-07.
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commercial and investment banking activities, :"s reduced the number of
situations in which the trustee was also an underwriter."
c. The Trustee as an Affiliate of Either the Issuer or Underwriter4 0For the same reasons that there is a conflict where the trustee is itself an
obligor or underwriter, the Act also provides that a conflict exists if the
trustee is in control of, is controlled by, or is under common control with
the obligor or an underwriter for the obligor.
d. Director or Officer Interlocks4 1--The Act provides that if there are
more interlocks between the trustee and the obligor (or underwriter) than
one director or executive officer each way,' 2 a conflict exists; however.,
one additional interlock is allowed if the trustee has more than nine directors. More specifically, a conflict is present if the trustee or any of its
directors or executive officers is a director, officer, partner, employee, appointee, or representative either of the obligor, or of an underwriter for
the obligor who is currently engaged in the business of underwriting. However, one individual may be a director or an executive officer of the trustee, and a director or an executive officer of the obligor, so long as he is
not an executive officer of both. Also, if the number of directors of the
trustee in office is more than nine, one additional person may be both a
director and an executive officer of the trustee and a director of the obligor. The trustee still may serve in such ministerial capacities as transfer
agent, registrar, custodian, paying agent, fiscal agent, escrow agent, or
depositary, or as a trustee under another indenture or otherwise, unless
Section 310(b)(1), relating to dual trusteeships under indentures, is violated. 43 Thus, despite the potential conflicts of interest that may develop,
a trustee may have two representatives on the board of the obligor (if the
trustee has over nine directors), one of whom could also be an executive
officer of the obligor.
The interlock provisions of the Act reflect an ambivalence about the
usefulness of interlocks. The SEC's Report on Protective and Reorganization Committees, which led to the Act, stated:
Representation of the issuer on the board of the trustee may
give rise to an alliance which is dangerous to the security holders represented by the trustee, since the interests of debtor and
creditor are commonly antithetical. This conflict certainly arises
where such representation gives the issuer control of the trustee.
It may likewise arise where a minority of the board of the trustee is composed of officers or directors of the issuer, especially
in times of trouble when the trustee is preparing to take active
steps to collect the debt [etc.] ....The same considerations apply to allowing a director or officer of the issuer to be an exec38 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 335, 377, 378 (1970). For a discussion of the relevant
provisions of the Banking Act, see 2 L. Loss, supra note 13, at 1189-90 & n.21 (1961).
39 Ci. Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
40
Trust Indenture Act § 310(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(3) (1970).
41 Trust Indenture Act § 310(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(4) (1970).
42 See S. REP. No. 248, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1939); H.R. REP. No. 1016,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1939).
43 See note 33 and accompanying text supra.
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utive officer of the trustee.... [I] t is part of prudence and safety
to eliminate the issuer from the councils of the trustee.
The same considerations apply to situations where the trustee owns or represents stock or other junior interests of the isuer....

On the other hand the trustee should not be disqualified from
being represented on the board of directors of the issuer. It is
frequently the part of prudence and wisdom for creditors to be
represented on the board of the debtor. From that vantage
point creditors can, through their representative, more adequately protect their interests against improvident or fraudulent acts than if they are debarred from participating in the
councils of the debtor ....
As a matter of fact, since we conclude that the necessary reform is to make these trustees active
trustees, such affiliation may at times be almost essential
if
44
they are to perform the obligations of that trusteeship.
While the SEC was concerned with the possibility of the obligor thwarting the trustee's efforts to enforce the bondholders' rights, it paid little,
if any, attention to the possibility of the trustee misusing inside informaion received in its capacity as director or officer of the obligor.
e. Ownership of the Trustee's Voting Securities4 -- The Act states that
there is a conflict if the obligor or any director, partner, or executive officer of the obligor owns 10 percent or more of the trustee's voting securities, or if any combination of such persons owns 20 percent or more of
such securities. A conflict also exists if an underwriter for the obligor, or
any director, partner, or executive officer of that underwriter, or any combination of these persons owns 10 percent or more of the trustee's voting
securities. This status constitutes a conflict even if the proscribed ownership does not constitute control of the trustee.
f. Ownership of the Obligor's Voting Securities46-A conflict exists
if the trustee beneficially owns or holds, as collateral for an obligation that
is in default, 5 percent or more of the voting securities of the obligor, 10
percent or more of any other class of the obligor's securities (other than
securities issued under indentures under which the trustee serves), or 10
percent or more of any class of securities of an underwriter for the obligor.
g. Ownership of an Affiliate's Voting Securities4 7 -The trustee has a
conflict if it beneficially owns or holds, as collateral for an obligation in
default, 5 percent or more of the voting securities of an affiliate (control
person) of the obligor. Likewise, there is a conflict if the trustee owns or
so holds that same interest in a person who, though not in control of the
obligor, holds 10 percent or more of the obligor's voting securities.
h. Ownership of the Securities of the Parent48-If the trustee bene-

44 VI SEC 1936 REPORT, supra note 5, at 99-101.
45 Trust Indenture Act § 310(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(5)
46 Trust Indenture Act § 31 0(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(6)
47 Trust Indenture Act § 310(b)(7), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(7)
48 Trust Indenture Act § 310(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(8)

(1970).
(1970).
(1970).
(1970).
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ficially owns or holds, as collateral security for an obligation in default,
10 percent or more of any class of security of a person who owns 50 percent or more of the voting securities of the obligor, a conflict exists.
i. The Holding of Securities in a Trust Capacity'-lf the indenture
trustee holds, either in its capacity as executor, administrator, trustee,
guardian, committee, or conservator, or in other similar capacities, 25 percent or more of any class of securities of the obligor or of any other person listed in paragraphs (6), (7), or (8) of Section 310(b),50 there is a
conflict. The indenture may provide, however, that if securities, which
bring the trustee's holdings above the 25 percent limit, are acquired as
an executor, administrator, or trustee of an estate, and the holdings of he
estate itself were less than the limit, the Act's conflict provisions will not
be triggered until two years after acquisition of the proscribed holdings.
The procedural provisions accompanying this section indicate that this is
perhaps the most sensitive of the conflict provisions, even though the
chances of a bank's holding such a large block of stock in its trust department seem minimal where the issuing corporation enjoys sufficient
51
investor interest to permit a public floatation of debt securities.
While the Act provides for only a yearly determination by the trustee
of its trust department holdings, further obligations are imposed on the
trustee when the obligor defaults in the payment of either principal or
interest and the default continues for thirty days. In such a case, the trustee must promptly check its trust department holdings, and a conflict exists
if its holdings exceed the more constraining percentages specified in paragraphs (6), (7), and (8) of Section 310(b), rather than the less restrictive
25 percent figure specified in paragraph (9). This requirement corresponds
to the higher obligation generally placed upon a trustee after default.
In 1939, while discussing this provision of the Act, the Senate Committee stated that ownership of securities in a represenative capacity
"is given separate and more liberal treatment ...on the theory that such
ownership does not involve as direct a conflict as beneficial ownership."; 2
The absence of concern about the misuse of inside information passing
between the corporate trust department and the personal trust department
may surprise the present day reader.
2. Misuse of Inside Information-In 1939 the drafters of the Trust
Indenture Act had rather narrow objectives. They were almost exclusively
concerned with the potential harm arising from the presence of indenture
trustees with divided loyalties. Alliances between the trustee and either
the management of the obligor or the junior creditors could lessen the
49 Trust Indenture Act § 31 0(b)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(9) (1970).

50 See notes 46-48 and accompanying text supra.
51 This conclusion is supported by a recent Senate report. SENATE GOV'T OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS AND BUDGETING, MANAGEMENT AND EXPENDITURES, DISCLOSURE OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP (1973), [herein-

after cited as SENATE DISCLOSURE REPORT]. Excerpts from the report are reprinted
in 234 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. G-1 (Jan. 9, 1974), and in BNA WASH. FINANCIAL
REP. No. 3 at p. T-1 (Jan. 21, 1974).
52 S. REP. No. 248, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1939).

Journal of Law Reform

[VOL. 7:329

trustee's diligence in enforcing the rights of bondholders. These alliances
were the primary evil to be combated.
In order to obtain responsible trustees, 5 1 the drafters required, in
Section 310(a)(1)4 of the Act, that each indenture covered by the Act
be trusteed by an institution that is incorporated and authorized to exercise corporate trust powers under federal or state law and is subject to
the supervision of or examination by federal or state agencies. In this
provision, however, lay the seeds of another kind of conflict, hardly apparent in the 1930's, but of great importance today. State and federal regulatory statutes do not contemplate the existence of separate institutions
solely exercising corporate trust powers. Rather, banks and trust companies are generally authorized to offer a broad spectrum of trust services.i '
Thus, the typical indenture trustee will also administer personal trusts, in
which it has investment discretion, and act as trustee for pension and
employee-benefit plans, in which it has varying degrees of investment
discretion. 5 6 These other trust responsibilities may involve the management of equity portfolios which contain, among other holdings, stock of
corporations for which the institution is indenture trustee.
The combining of these different trust functions in a single institution
gives rise to a new problem. As indenture trustee, the institution should
obtain various types of financial and other information in order to determine whether the corporate issuer has complied with the covenants in the
indenture. If the indenture trustee, by virtue of its position, obtains, nonpublic information that would be relevant to the price of the obligor's
stock, this information might be used improperly to benefit the institution's interests in its role as manager of equity portfolios. 57 For example,
if the trust department learned of an impending default, it might sell off
its holding of the corporation's common stock. Recognizing the potential
for misuse of inside information in another area, banks recently have established formal procedures in an attempt to prevent the exchange of in53The Act, in Section 302(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb(a)(3) (1970), sets forth the
necessity for the statute and states that the public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected "when the trustee does not have resources commensurate
with its responsibilities.
... Section 310(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(a)(2) (1970), also
requires the indenture to provide that the institutional trustee have a combined
capital and surplus of not less that $150,000. This amount is obviously inadequate
by present-day standards, and indentures for sizable issues often require a minimum
capital and surplus of $5,000,000. See J. KENNEDY, CORPORATE TRUST ADMINISTRATION 40 (1961).
54 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(a)(l) (1970).
55 Under 12 U.S.C. § 92(a) (1970), national banks may be given trust powers which
state banks and trust companies are permitted to have under applicable state law. An
example of the broad powers granted by state law to trust companies is N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 100 (McKinney 1971).
56 See 2 INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY, supra note 15, at 423-48 (1971).
57 The potential use of inside information by bank trust departments was highlighted by the STAFF OF HOUSE BANKING AND CURRENCY COMM., 92d Cong., 1st
Sess., REPORT ON THE PENN CENTRAL FAILURE AND THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, pt. V, at 313 (1972) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE BANKING AND CURRENCY
COMM. STAFF REPORT].
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formation between lending and trust officers. 5s It would also seem appropriate that similar precautions be taken to prevent corporate trust officers
from passing on inside information to personal trust officers. However,
banks routinely place their corporate trust responsibilities in the same
department with other trust activities.5 9
The dangers of misuse of inside information are particularly acute when
the trustee holds large amounts of an obligor's stock in its other fiduciary capacities. 6 The larger the trustee's holdings of stock in discretionary trust accounts, the greater will be the institution's temptation to bail
out when times are troubled, and the more adverse will be the effect on
the market price of the stock. But the extent to which indenture trustees
hold equity securities of obligors is largely unknown. 61 Although the
Trust Indenture Act limits such ownership to 25 percent of a class of the
obligor's securities,"2 the SEC does not require initial or periodic reporting by a trustee of the amounts of an obligor's equity securities held in
fiduciary capacities. 6' Under Section 313(a)64 of the Act, the indenture
must require the trustee to transmit annual reports to indenture security
holders. The trustee may, however, as to Section 310, merely state that
"to the best of its knowledge it has continued to be eligible and qualified." 6- Further, even if reporting were adequate, the 25 percent limitation provides little protection, since much smaller percentage holdings
often may give the institution working control of the publicly held com66
pany.
Presumably, the use of the word "trust" has papered over the real conflicts that may exist when duties as a corporate trustee and as a trustee
for personal and employee trusts holding equity securities are carried out
58 See Herman & Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the
"Wall", 14 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 21 (1972). But cf. Hazzard v. Chase Manhattan
Bank, 159 Misc. 57, 74-78, 287 N.Y.S. 541, 559-64 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, 1936).
59 The COMPTROLLER'S MANUAL FOR REPRESENTATIVES IN TRUSTS (1963), which

provides directions for examination of the trust departments of national banks to
personnel of the Bureau of the Comptroller of the Currency, assumes that the corporate trust division will be part of the bank's trust department. 4 CCH FED. BANKING L. REP.
59,211 et seq., 59,326 et seq. (1963).
60 Cf. the proposal by Senator Lloyd Bentsen to limit bank trust department holdings to 5 or 10 percent of any company's stock. BNA WASH. FINANCIAL REP., Dec. 3,
1973, at A- 1l.
61 For some recently released figures on bank trust department holdings see
SENATE DISCLOSURE REPORT, supra note 51. The report does not relate bank trust
department stockholdings to corporate trust functions.
62Trust Indenture Act § 310(b)(9), 15 U.S.C. § 77jjj(b)(9) (1970). See note 50 and
accompanying text supra.
63The SEC's Form T-1, "Statement of Eligibility and Qualification Under Trust
Indenture Act of 1939 of a Corporation Designated to Act as Trustee," does not call
for this information, even though it does require information deemed necessary to
determine whether the trustee is eligible and qualified under the other provisions of
Section 310 of the Act. 3 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
43,103-06 (1968).
64 15 U.S.C. § 77mmm(a) (1970).
65 Trust Indenture Act § 313(a)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 77mmm(a)(1) (1970).
66 Cf. Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL L.Q.
628, 630-33 (1965).
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simultaneously. 6 7 For example, the 1972 Annual Report of the Chase
Manhattan Corporation makes special mention of "a strict policy of separation between officers and staff members handling trust and fiduciary
But, in discussing
accounts and those involved in other activities . "..."68
its trust activities, it states that
[I]n addition to its services for individuals, the Trust Department also performs various functions for corporations and insitutions.... [I]t acts as corporate trustee under some 1,400
bond issues brought out by over 700 public agencies and private business concerns. .

.."69

Nevertheless, it seems probable that the potential conflicts are generally
ignored because indenture trustees, prior to default, receive little nonpublic information as a result of their trusteeships. 70 Indentures may,7 ' and
generally do, 72 contain provisions stating that prior to default the indenture trustee shall not be liable except for the performance of duties specifically set out in the indenture. Considering the potential conflicts that
might arise from an active search for nonpublic information, 73 a prudent
trustee is likely to avoid such a search.
This state of affairs should cause dismay among indenture security holders. When banks make direct loans to corporations, it seems implicit that
they would insist upon receiving certain kinds of information which must
be insulated from the trust department. However, when these banks act
as trustee for public lenders under a trust indenture, they apparently do
not insist on this type of information. The fact that the Trust Indenture
74
Act does not require them to do so is regrettable.
3. The Trustee as a Lender: Section 311 75-Even though the Trust
Indenture Act requires a trustee to resign if he is a -trustee for other lenders whose interests may be adverse, 76 strangely enough, nothing prohibits
a trustee which itself is a lender from continuing to serve. In its 1936
Study of Protective and Reorganization Committees, the SEC recommended the following:
Either corporate trusteeships must be divorced from commercial banks and made the exclusive function of trust institutions

67 For the same observation as to the interchangeability of personal trust and
corporate trust personnel, see Phol, The Administration of Trust Indentures by Corporate Trustees, TRUST BULL., Apr., 1957, at 81-82.

THE CHASE MANHATTAN CORP., ANN. REP. 1972, at 45.
Id. at 44.
CI. Johnson, supra note 19, at 215-16.
Trust Indenture Act § 315(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a) (1970).
72 See, e.g., ABF, MODEL DEBENTURE INDENTURE PROVISIONS, ALL REGISTERED
ISSUES § 601(a) (1967) [hereinafter cited as ABF MODEL PROVISIONS].
68
69
70
71

73

Cf. In the Matter of Investors Management Co., Inc., SEC Securities Exchange
78,163

Act Release No. 9267, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
(1971).
74 See notes 99-100 and 105-11 and accompany text infra.
75 15 U.S.C. § 77kkk (1970).
76 Trust Indenture Act § 3 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 77jjj(b) (1970).
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specializing in the business of acting as trustee; or a commercial bank acting as trustee for securities of a corporation should
not be permitted to hold a management, ownership or creditor
position in that company or have any other interest inconsistent
with its fiduciary responsibilities. Nothing short of such measures will insure adequate protection to the bank's depositors
and stockholders, and to the investors for whom they purport
to act as trustee. The large number of banks which function as
corporate trustees without being short term creditors of the issuer demonstrates that this separation of functions is prac77
tical.
Congress, however, rejected the recommendation that indenture trustees be precluded from being direct creditors. Instead, Section 311 of the
Act merely sets up a structure which attempts to prevent the preferential
collection of claims by a trustee. The Act generally requires an indenture
provision stating that if the trustee becomes or remains a creditor of the
obligor within four months prior to or after a default in principal or interest, steps must be taken so that the trustee's loan is not collected ahead
of the obligations to indenture security holders. In order to accomplish
this, the trustee, unless and until the default is cured, must set aside in a
special account, for the benefit of both the trustee individually and the
bondholders, any amounts collected. When the trustee has set aside the
amounts collected, it then must account for them in such a way that it and
the indenture security holders will realize the same percentage of their
respective claims from a combination of these amounts and any dividends
on unsecured claims in bankruptcy or receivership proceedings. Section
311 sets out in great detail the operation of the provisions that are aimed
at ensuring equality of treatment. Specifically, the trustee must set aside an
amount equal to all valid reductions in principal or interest effected during
the statutorily defined period, plus all property received either in satisfaction for or as security for obligations to the trustee.
The trustee, however, is able to exercise some priority over the bondholders under certain conditions. The trustee may retain reductions resulting from any right of setoff which the trustee in bankruptcy could have
exercised if a petition had been filed on the date of default; it may retain
payments made by persons other than the obligor, proceeds of the sale of
a claim to a third person, or distributions received under either the
Bankruptcy Act or state receivership laws; it may retain proceeds from
the sale of property held as security if such property was held prior to the
four-month period; and the trustee may retain the proceeds of property
received as a security interest within the four-month period if such security was received simultaneously with the granting of the loan, and if the
trustee proves that it had no reasonable cause to believe that a default of
principal or interest under the indenture would occur within four months.
Thus, a trustee is not discouraged from making a bona fide "rescue" or

77 VI SEC 1936 REPORT, supra note 5, at 107.
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"distress" loan. 78 Likewise, the trustee may receive payment against release of property held as security, to the extent of the fair value of the
property, where it could have retained the proceeds from the sale of the
collateral.
A leading commentator suggests that the congressional decision, allow79
ing trustees also to be direct creditors, was a wise one:
The more important and experienced trust institutions are also
large commercial banks and have important credit arrangements
with corporate obligors. If extension of credit were prohibited,
these institutions would unquestionably surrender their corporate
trust relations with these obligors. Instead of benefiting security
holders, such a step would provide them with a less experienced and capable trustee.8 0
The wisdom of this decision, however, is not that clear. While the drafters of Section 311 of the Trust Indenture Act permitted the indenture
trustee to lend funds directly to the obligor, they limited the situations in
which the trustee could serve as a trustee under another indenture. s ' Certainly the conflicts arising when a bank acts both as a direct lender and as
a trustee for public lenders are no less than those arising when a bank acts
as a trustee for two sets of public lenders. Rather, Section 311 seems to
have been a clear victory for the banking industry, permitting banks to
maintain their normal banking relationships with a corporation while si82
multaneously serving as indenture trustee.
Further, the wisdom embodied in Section 311 distorts the concept that
an indenture trustee is a fiduciary. In effect, the section turns a failure by
the obligor to pay principal or interest into "constructive bankruptcy" insofar as the trustee's position is concerned. By voiding preferential payments and liens received by the trustee within four months before or
subsequent to default in the payment of principal or interest, and by requiring such preferences to be applied pro rata to debts owed to the trustee and to the indenture security holders, the trustee receives essentially
the treatment that a creditor would receive if the obligor on the indenture
78 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 48 (1939). See also Note, supra note
4, at 110.
Encouraging the trustee-lender to advance funds at a time of financial difficulty
for the obligor is consistent with the trustee's fiduciary duties to bondholders. The
"distress" loan may prevent an impending default by the obligor. Courts have generally recognized the value of encouraging a lender to bail out a financially troubled
business. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1955), Arnold v.
Phillips, 117 F.2d 497 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 583 (1941).
79 J. KENNEDY, supra note 53, at 54.
80 These comments are strangely reminiscent of the reaction of the banking industry to the proposals to separate commercial banking and investment banking
functions which later became part of the Banking Act of 1933. In the early 1930's,
one bank official predicted that the proposed requirements would cripple the system
of distributing securities. V. CAROSSO, INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA 370 (1970).

81 See notes 33-35 and accompanying text supra.
82 See Note, The Trust Indenture Act of 1939: Limitation on the Trustee's Privilege of Lending to the Obligor, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 523 (1940).
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securities had filed a petition in bankruptcy on the date of default in the
payment of principal or interest. This treatment hardly seems consistent
with the fiduciary duties placed upon a trustee for public debt holders. It
would seem that the trustee's duty to act for the benefit of his cestui que
trust ought to require at least that all property in his possession or control
be applied first to the claims of the indenture security holders whose
claims are not otherwise specifically subordinated to those of the lendertrustee. Further, it should be noted that the "default" which triggers the
antipreference provisions of Section 311 is only default in the payment of
principal or interest. In contrast, under Section 35(c) of the Act, 83 other
events of default as well as these create a higher standard of care which
84
the trustee is required to exercise in default administration.
Illustrative of the dismal position of the holders of indenture securities
is the following common situation. Compensating balance arrangements
are becoming an increasingly integral part of banks' financing arrangements. A corporation often will be required to maintain a minimum balance in a checking account, or to hold a low-interest certificate of deposit
in order to maintain either current borrowing privileges or a line of credit
for future borrowing,s This compensating balance arrangement can have
several adverse effects on indenture security holders under the provisions
of the Trust Indenture Act.
First, insofar as these compensating balances are subject to withdrawal
restrictions, they decrease the ability of the obilgor to meet interest payments on indenture securities. Therefore, the possibility of default is increased.8 6
Second, it appears that the lending bank may retain all amounts in the
87
borrower's compensating balance accounts in payment of its loan.
Section 311(a)(1)88 provides that the trustee need not set apart for pro
rata distribution any reduction in liability resulting from any right of setoff which the trustee could have exercised if a petition in bankruptcy had
been filed by or against the obligor upon the date of default. Under the
Bankruptcy Act, the trustee could have set off the balances in the obli83 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (1970).
84 An anomalous situation could

arise in which a "default" has occurred for purposes of Section 311, but not for purposes of Section 315(c). Since Section 315(c) permits the indenture to define "default," often failure in the payment of interest is not a
default unless it continues for thirty days, for example. See Johnson, supra note 19, at
223-25.
85 See text of SEC Draft for Compensating Balances Release, 180 BNA SEC. REG.
& L. REP. J-1 (Dec. 6, 1972). See also Securities Act Release No. 5436, Adoption of
Amendments to Regulation S-X (Nov. 13, 1973), 3 SEC DOCK. 33 (Nov. 27, 1973),
228 BNA SEC. REG. & L. REP. D-1 (Nov. 21, 1973).

86 The SEC's new disclosure requirements for compensating balance arrangements
consider the effect of such arrangements on liquidity to be the important test of
materiality for purposes of disclosure. See Securities Act Release No. 5436, supra
note 85.
87 Cf. the activities of Guaranty Trust Co., described in text accompanying note
29 supra.
88 15 U.S.C. § 77kkk(a)(1) (1970).
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gor's other accounts against any loans outstanding.8 9
Third, it is not clear that the trustee, in its annual report to indenture
security holders, even needs to report the existence of compensating balance arrangements. Section 313(a)(3) requires only that the trustee report
with respect to
the amount, interest rate and maturity date of all other indebtedness owing to it in its individual capacity, on the date of such
report, by the obligor upon the indenture securities, with a
brief description of any property held as collateral security
therefore ....90
Is a compensating balance "property held as collateral security"? Perhaps
"property" in this context does not include such cash items, since the
very next section of the statute refers separately to "property" and "funds"
in possession of the indenture trustee." Even if compensating balances
are property, it is unclear whether they are "held as collateral security,"
although courts occasionally treat the right of setoff as a common law
banker's lien on funds in other accounts of the debtor.9"' Since banks
seem primarily interested in the use of compensating balance arrangements to effectively increase interest rates, it may be argued that the
funds are held for that purpose, and only serve incidentally as collateral
security for outstanding loans, even if the common law banker's lien does
93
extend to such funds.
Thus, the situations that the Act sanctions benefit the banking industry
rather than the bondholders under a trust indenture. Not only does the
Act fail to achieve its goal of eliminating conflicts of interest, but it also
has codified rules which encourage the creation and existence of such
conflicts.
B. The Trustee's Standard of Conduct
A second important purpose of the Trust Indenture Act was to assure
that the indenture trustee would observe high standards of conduct while
Bankruptcy Act § 68, II U.S.C. § 108 (1970). See also S. RIESENFELD, CREDREMEDIES AND DEBTORS PROTECTION 556-61 (1967); Note, supra note 82, at
530-31.
90 15 U.S.C. § 77mmm(a)(3) (t970).
91 Trust Indenture Act § 313(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77mmm(a)(4) (1970).
92 At common law, the banker's lien extended to securities and valuables in the
banker's possession, while money left on deposit was subject to setoff. See Gunn v.
Stockyards State Bank, 97 Kan. 404, 155 P. 796 (1916); Nolting v. National Bank,
99 Va. 54, 37 S.E. 804 (1901); 5 C. ZOLLMAN, BANKS AND BANKING § 3051, at 71
(perm. ed. 1936). A few courts, however, have treated the right to set off money left
89

ITORS

on deposit as a banker's lien against such funds. See King v. Porter, 230 Ala. 112,
160 So. 101 (1935); First Nat'l Bank v. Coplen, 39 Cal. App. 619, 179 P. 708 (Cal.
Dist Ct. App. (1919).
93 Presumably, property may be "held as collateral security" even though it is not
subject to a lien. It would seem that the setoff right may be considered as collateral
security. Cf. Overcash v. First Nat'l Bank, 115 Ga. App. 499, 501-02, 155 S.E.2d 32,
34 (1967), finding, in another context, that a contract of suretyship was collateral
security.
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acting on behalf of security holders.'" As Section 302(a)(2) of the Act
recites,
the general and reasonable assumption by ...investors [is] that
the trustee is under an affirmative duty to take action for the
protection and enforcement of their rights, [but] trust indentures
(A) generally provide that the trustee shall be under no duty to
take any such action, even in the event of default, unless it receives notice of default, demand for action, and indemnity,
from the holders of substantial percentages of the securities outstanding thereunder, and (B) generally relieve the trustee from
liability even for its own negligent action or failure to act. .... 5
The abuses which prevailed prior to the enactment of the Trust Indenture Act had been well documented. 1 6 Indicative of the passive stance
that the trustee maintained was the testimony of a leading corporate
trust officer who said that he viewed the indenture trustee as merely a
mechanical bookkeeping agent who took action only when ordered to do
97
so by the bondholders.
s
Sections 314) and 3159" of the Act were designed to remedy the situation. Section 314 requires that the obligor on the indenture securities file certain reports with the indenture trustee as evidence of compliance with the provisions of the indenture. 10" Section 315 is the key
section defining the trustee's duties and responsibilities. The section essentially sets up a dual set of criteria, one to guide the trustee prior to
default, and a second for post-default guidance. In all cases, events of
default may be defined by the indenture and are not limited by the
Act.101
The provisions of Section 315 were written against the background of
indentures containing broad exculpatory clauses. Section 315(a) 10 2 sets
out certain permissible exculpatory provisions. The indenture may provide that, prior to default, the trustee shall be liable only for failure to
94 See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1939). See also Katz, Responsibility of Trustees Under the Federal Trust Indenture Act of 1939, 26
A.B.A.J. 290 (1940).
95 15 U.S.C. § 77bbb(a)(2) (1970).
96 See VI SEC 1936 REPORT, supra note 5, at 2-70.
97 VI SEC 1936 REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
98 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn (1970).
99 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (1970).
100 See notes 140-43 and 172-73 and accompanying text infra for a discussion of
the adequacy of these provisions.
101 The original proposal submitted to Congress would have given the SEC
authority to establish rules as to what should constitute events of default. See Katz,
supra note 94, at 290. Cf. Trust Indenture Act § 311(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77kkk(a) (1970),
which defines "default" for the purposes of that section's antipreference provisions.
The ABF MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 72, at § 501, provide for the following
as events of default: 1) a default in the payment of interest that continues for thirty
days; 2) a default in the payment of principal; 3) nonperformance or breach of any
covenant or warranty that continues for thirty days after notice of the default has been
given by the trustee or by 10 percent of the debenture holders; and, 4) bankruptcy,
insolvency or similar proceedings.
102 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a) (1970).
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perform the duties specifically set out in the indenture. In addition, the
indenture may provide that, prior to default, the trustee need not make
any independent investigation of statements or opinions furnished in conformity with the requirements of the indenture, so long as the trustee is
not acting in "bad faith," and so long as it examines the evidence of compliance furnished pursuant to Section 314103 to determine whether the
evidence conforms to the requirements of the indenture.
In case of a default, however, the trustee's duties change.104 Section
315(c) requires indentures to provide that, in case of default, the trustee
exercise "such of the rights and powers vested in it by such indenture,
and ...

use the same degree of care and skill in their exercise, as a pru-

dent man would exercise or use under the circumstances in the conduct
10 5
of his own affairs.'
10 6
Section 315(d)
further limits the exculpatory clauses which may be
contained in the indenture. The indenture may not contain proviSions
relieving the trustee from liability for its own negligent action, for negligent failure to act, or for willful misconduct. However, the indenture may
contain the provisions permitted by Section 315(a)10 7 and provisions protecting the trustee from liability for any error in judgment made in good
faith by a responsible officer of the trustee, unless the trustee was negligent in ascertaining the pertinent facts. The indenture may also protect the
trustee against liability with respect to action taken or omitted in good
faith, in accordance with the directions of the holders of not less than a
majority of the principal amount of the indenture securities.
The structure of the Act, which makes a default the triggering device
that turns a passive trustee into an active one, creates a significant problem as to the trustee's duty to discover defaults. This problem is illustrated by the alleged facts in the recent litigation relating to the provisions
of the indenture of Webb & Knapp. 1 8 The indenture required the obligor, Webb & Knapp, to certify the absence of defaults to the trustee
annually in writing. The indenture prohibited Webb & Knapp from purchasing real property or incurring additional indebtedness unless it maintained a ratio of assets to liabilities of 200 percent. It was claimed that
from 1954 to 1964 Webb & Knapp submitted certifications on the basis
of inflated appraisals of its assets. The trustee accepted these certifications,
103*15 U.S.C. § 77nnn (1970).
104 See generally J. KENNEDY, supra note 53, at 195-212; Johnson, supra note 19,

pts. 1-3, at 203, 374, 509 (1970-71).
105 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (1970). The original bill proposed to Congress would
have given the SEC authority to impose predefault duties on the trustee, "consistent
with the duties . . . which a prudent man would assume and perform prior to such
default if he were trustee under such an indenture." The postdefault standard of
care would have been that of a prudent man "if he were a fiduciary and had the
degree of skill which the indenture trustee has, or which the indenture trustee . . .
represents itself as having whichever is the higher." See Katz, supra note 94, at 291.
106 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(d) (1970).
107

15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a) (1970).

108Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406 U.S. 416 (1972), afl'g 439
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1971); Lewis v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., CCH FED.
SEC. L. REP.
94,206 (S.D.N.Y., Nov. 7, 1973).
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even though the appraisals had been accompanied by a note stating that
they represented the view of the officers of Webb & Knapp "as to what
the properties could be sold for on a cash basis under favorable market
conditions after their earning power shall have been clearly established."10 9
While the merits of the substantive claim have not yet been determined, it seems clear that a problem exists if legislation as comprehensive
as the Trust Indenture Act fails to force the trustee to discover such fairly
obvious defaults as were allegedly present here. The problem is particularly acute when certain covenants, such as those relating to the maintenance of working capital," 0 are included as early-warning indicators of
financial problems. Nevertheless, Section 315(a) of the Act"' permits,
and indentures usually include,' 12 provisions stating that prior to default,
in the absence of bad faith, "" the trustee may conclusively rely upon
certificates by officers or others which are in proper form, without having
to make its own independent investigation. 1 4 Upon default, however,
the trustee's duties increase." 5 Does this mean that the exculpatory provisions permitted by Section 315(a) are of no practical consequence in
the context of certification of compliance with covenants in the indenture?
Does the trustee become absolutely liable under a higher degree of care
immediately upon the occurrence of a default, even if the default is unknown to him?11 6
As a practical matter, these questions are answered in the negative.
While theoretically the trustee becomes liable for a higher standard of
care even upon the occurrence of a default not reasonably discoverable,
the indenture can easily protect against this higher burden. Since "default"
is a term of art, the definition of which is left to the indenture, 1 7 a default may be defined as occurring, for example, only after the trustee is
notified of the default by the security holders, or after a requisite number
of security holders or the trustee notifies the obligor of the default. The
American Bar Foundation's Model Debenture Indenture provisions require such notice to trigger an "event of default" in all cases, except for
the failure to pay principal or interest, bankruptcy, or a similar proceeding
18
involving the obligor.
109 See Brief for Petitioner at 2-5, Caplin v. Marine Midland Grace Trust Co., 406
U.S. 416, 417-20 (1972).
110 See ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 452-55.

111 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(a) (1970).
See ABF MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 72, at § 601(a)(2).

112

113 The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Caplin v. Marine Midland
Grace Trust Co. suggests that "bad faith" is shown in relying upon officers' certficates when there is wilful misconduct or gross negligence on the part of the trustee.
406 U.S. at 439 & n.4 (1972).
114 See Johnson, supra note 19, at 225-26.

115 Trust Indenture Act § 315(c), 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(c) (1970). See notes 104-05

and accompanying text supra.

116 See Katz, supra note 94, at 291.
117 See Johnson, supra note 19, at 223-25.
118 ABF MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 72, at § 501. See also Johnson, supra note

19, at 227-36.
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Thus, breach of most of the indenture covenants that protect indenture
security holders is to be discovered by a trustee who is essentially passive.
The primary sources of information to which the trustee has access are
whatever reports the indenture requires the obligor to furnish. Whether
this procedure provides a sufficient basis for detecting defaults can be
determined only by examining the types of covenants commonly used today to protect indenture security holders.
The primary problem arises in connection with those covenants which
are essentially prophylactic in nature, i.e., those which are intended to
prevent the more serious default of failure to pay principal or interest.
This general group of prophylactic covenants may be divided into various
categories. First, covenants may require the obligor to maintain insurance.
The coverage required may be not only against casualty losses on properties, but also against liability for crippling judgments, and key-man life
insurance on selected executives.1 19
A second group of covenants may limit future encumbering of property.
These covenants are often referred to as "negative pledge clauses." They
attempt to prevent other creditors from obtaining priority over debentures, either by requiring that the debentures participate ratably with
future creditors in the proceeds of any property pledged as security, or by
completely prohibiting the creation of liens. These covenants may become
long and intricate in attempting to deal with the many business situations
1 20
which might give rise to claims having priority over the debentures.
A third type of covenant may impose limits upon the amount of additional debt which the obligor may incur. Here again, the formula utilized
for determining the permissible amount of debt may be complex. One
example of such a covenant is the prescribed asset to liabilities ratio present in the Webb & Knapp indenture discussed above. 1 21 The covenants
may be cast in terms of prescribed ratios between liabilities and net tangible assets, capitalization, or tangible net worth, with each of these terms
carefully being defined in the indenture. A number of other variations of
debt limitations are also possible.1 22 Policing compliance with these limitations may require careful auditing in light of each definitional provision.
A fourth type of covenant may limit the payment of dividends and
similar distributions, often using a formula pegged to the amount of re1 23
tained earnings as of the date of the issuance of the debentures.
Other types of covenants may limit the disposition of assets by the
obligor, 1 24 the use of sale-leaseback transactions, 1 25 or may require the
1 26
maintenance of certain levels of working capital.
119 See
120 See
121 See
122 See

ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 341-48.
id. at 349-67.
notes 108-09 and accompanying text supra.
ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 368-400.

Id. at
Id. at
125 Id. at
126 Id. at
123

401-21.

124

422-3 1.

432-49.
450-56.
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How is an essentially passive trustee to police compliance with these
complex covenants? The Act contemplates that the trustee will receive
reports from the obligor as to compliance with the covenants.1 27 Section
314,128 however, in its specific terms was drafted largely to confront the
problems raised by mortgage bonds or by conditions precedent to action
by the trustee. The drafters of Section 314 left to the SEC the rule-making
authority to deal with the policing of compliance with prophylactic debenture covenants. Thus, Section 314(b)'2 0 requires an indenture provision
compelling the obligor to provide opinions of counsel as to compliance
with any recording requirements that are necessary to perfect a lien on
the property which serves as security under the indenture. Further, if the
indenture contains conditions precedent relating to authentication and
delivery of the indenture securities, release or release and substitution of
property subject to the lien of the indenture, satisfaction and discharge of
the indenture, or any other action to be taken by the trustee at the request of the obligor, then Section 314(c) 1 0 demands an indenture provision requiring opinions regarding compliance with such conditions precedent by officers of the obligor, counsel, and accountants. Finally, if the
indenture is secured by the mortgage of property or securities, Section
314(d)' 1 ' requires indenture provisions calling for an engineer, appraiser,
or similar expert to furnish certificates of fair value (1) as to property or
securities to be released from the lien of the indenture; 132 and (2) as to
property or securities the deposit of which is to be made the basis for
(a) authentication and delivery of indenture securities, (b) the withdrawal
of cash from the trust estate, or (c) the release of property or securities
113
from the lien of the indenture.
1 4
Only Section 314(a)' . deals with compliance with the type of debenture covenants described above.1 3 5 The section13 6 requires that provision be made for the obligor to file with the trustee the periodic reports
required by Section 13 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.' 3 Beyond this, provision must be made for the obligor to file such additional
information, documents, and reports as the SEC may require by rule with
the trustee and the SEC,1 31 and to submit this additional information to
holders of the indenture securities." 9 The SEC has not exercised its
rule-making authority in this area, despite the widely recognized fact that
See note 100 and accompanying text supra.
15 U.S.C. § 77nnn (1970).
129 Id. § 77nnn(b) (1970).
130 id. § 77nnn(c) (1970).
131 Id. § 77nnn(d) (1970).
132 Trust Indenture Act § 314(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn(d)(1) (1970).
133 Trust Indenture Act § 314(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn(d)(2) (1970).
134 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn(a) (1970).
135 See notes 118-25 and accompanying text supra.
136 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn(a)(1) (1970).
127

128

137
138
139

15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970).
15 U.S.C. § 77nnn(a)(2) (1970).
Id. § 77nnn(a)(3) (1970).
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the financial statements required to be filed under Section 13 of the
Securities Exchange Act often will not disclose defaults on indenture cov140
enants.
Even without the compulsion of SEC rules, it has become standard
practice to include an indenture provision requiring that annual statements
of compliance be filed with the trustee. The provision, however, commonly requires compliance certificates only from officers of the obligor.
Despite the presence of complex accounting formulas in many of the
covenants, 141 often no opinion of independent certified public accountants is required. 142 Some indentures do require certificates of compliance
to be issued by independent certified public accountants, but usually these
certificates merely provide for a statement that the accountants "obtained
no knowledge" of noncompliance during their examination of the cor143
poration's books.
Section 315 of the Act, as has been pointed out,1 4 4 permits indenture
provisions which allow the trustee to "conclusively rely, as to the truth of
the statements and the correctness of the opinions expressed therein, in the
absence of bad faith on the part of such trustee, upon certificates or opinions conforming to the requirements of the indenture."'1 45 Under these
conditions, the holders of indenture securities have little protection against
the furnishing of fraudulent or inaccurate certificates. Consequently, defaults may remain undiscovered. Because early discovery of defaults is
crucial, and delay often irreparable, there is a definite need for more
stringent reporting requirements.
II.

SUGGESTIONS

FOR CHANGE

A. Misuse of Inside Information
The potential for misuse of inside information by the trustee results
from the congressional decision to structure the Trust Indenture Act so as
to virtually ensure that indenture trustees will be commercial banks or
trust companies engaged in other trust business. 146 While rule 10b-5, under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provides a sufficient basis for
an after-the-fact remedy for misuse of inside information,147 there are
insufficient provisions in the securities acts to effectively prevent such
activities.
It should be noted that the harm resulting from the misuse of inside
information available to the corporate trustee probably does not affect the
holders of the corporate debt securities. Rather, the purchasers of the
140 ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 325.

141 See notes 120-21 and accompany text supra.
142 See ABF MODEL PROVISIONS, supra note 72, at § 1001.
143 ABF COMMENTARIES, supra note 1, at 334.

144 See notes 110-13 and accompanying text supra.
145 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (1970).
146 See notes 55-59 and accompanying text supra.
147 See generally A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD (1973).
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corporation's equity securities in the open market are the victims of the
misuse, which may result in tremendous profits being realized by the financial institutions when they sell equity securities. 148 Nevertheless, the
Trust Indenture Act should take account of the consequences of the institutional structures that it permits, and should not work against the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act. 149 If the Trust Indenture Act is to require that responsible trustees administer corporate trust
indentures, it should also consider the potential for illicit market activities
which this requirement creates. The potential for the misuse of information might be controlled in at least two ways: by increased supervision of
trustees' activities or by the separation of corporate trust departments from
other trust funcions. Both of these alternatives were suggested to and
rejected by the Congress in 1939.
In discussing the proposal for increased supervision of trustees, the
House Report on the Trust Indenture Act stated:
A proposal to amend the Senate bill so as to vest in the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System continuing jurisdiction over actual performance by indenture trustees was unfavorably reported by the Board itself and by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and was rejected by the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency. That proposal was renewed at the hearings on H.R. 5220. The committee does not
believe that it would accomplish the desired objectives. It
would cover only about 25 percent of the field-trust indentures under which the trustees are national banks. It would require detailed periodic examination of the trustee's actual performance of its obligations. It would come into operation only
after the improper action had occurred and the resulting loss
had been sustained by the bondholders, a loss which would
frequently have been prevented or minimized if the indenture
itself had been corrected.' 50
Certainly the Committee's first objection is not well taken. Today, many
state-chartered banks and trust companies join the Federal Reserve System,' 1 even though they are not required to become members. 152 At
the end of 1971, 1,092 state chartered banks belonged to the Federal
Reserve System. Although this figure accounted for only 12 percent of
all state commercial banks, these member banks accounted for 25 percent of all of the state commercial banking offices and held 50 percent of
148 Cf.

HOUSE BANKING

AND

CURRENCY

COMMITTEE STAFF

REPORT, supra

note

57, passimt.

149Since the institutional trustee requirements of section 310(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. §
77jjj(a)(1) (1970) virtually assure that indenture trustees will serve in various other
trust capacities, the Act creates a situation that fosters he dissemination and possible
misuse of inside information.
150 H.R. REP. No. 1016, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., 25-26 (1939).
151 These state-chartered institutions are permitted to become members of the
Federal Reserve System by virtue of 12 U.S.C. § 321 (1970).
152 REPORT

OF THE

PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FINANCIAL

STRUCTURE

AND

REGU-

supra note 16, at 65, recommends that membership in the Federal Reserve
System be required for all state-chartered commercial banks, among others.
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the total deposits in state commercial banks. 153 While figures do not appear to be available, it would seem likely that almost all trustees, for debt
issues of sufficient size to be subject to the Trust Indenture Act, would
54
be members of the Federal Reserve System.'
The second objection raised by the House Committee also seems insubstantial when applied to prevention of misuse of inside information.
Increased supervision need not operate only after loss has occurred. Supervision could be directed toward ensuring institutional structures that
would minimize the potential for the exchange of inside information.
Ultimately, the misuse of inside information would probably be controlled most effectively through separation of the corporate trust function
from other trust activities which might involve trading by the trustee of
the obligor's stock. Several types of separation are possible.
Corporate trust activities could be segregated from other trust activities
by the creation of a subsidiary corporation whose activities would be limited to furnishing corporate trust and related servicing functions. 155 At
least one Federal Reserve Board Governor has suggested that the general
trust departments of banks in bank holding companies be placed in distinct corporate entities. 56 Unfortunately, this type of separation has limited advantages. Even though the directors at the subsidiary level, in
theory, do not face conflicting duties, in practice, they are representatives
of the parent. The parent, which must select the directors of the subsidiary, continues to face the conflict of duties to the indenture security holders on the one hand, and to beneficiaries of personal trusts on the other.
The conflict arises both from selecting the directors, and from the resulting control of the subsidiary.
Perhaps more effective than mere legal separation would be a requirement of physical separation of corporate trust personnel from personnel
engaged in other trust activities. Internal rules limiting the transmission
of inside information are more easily enforceable if the parties who should
not exchange information do not have informal daily contacts over lunch
157
and coffee.
The most effective, but most difficult, type of separation is that which
would force corporate trustees to be completely independent from institutions which offer personal trust services. The problem inherent in a
complete independence requirement is the same as that in proposals which
seek to prohibit direct lending activities by corporate trustees, i.e., the
most experienced and qualified institutions may decide to give up their

153 BOARD OF GOVERNORS

OF

THE FEDERAL

RESERVE

SYSTEM,

59TH

ANN.

REP.

209-10 (1972).
154

See Trust Indenture Act § 304(a)(8), 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(8) (1970). See also

note 3 supra.

For a description of the functions involved in servicing debt securities, see
supra note 53, at 140-74.
156 Remarks of Jeffrey M. Bucher, discussed in 38 BNA WASH. FINANCIAL REP.
A-16 (Sept. 24, 1973).
157 See Herman & Safanda, supra note 58, at 37.
155

J.

KENNEDY,
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corporate trust activities rather than limit other services.' 5 In fact, there
seem to be no existing institutions, other than those handling personal
trust business, that are equipped to act as corporate trustees, and it is
questionable whether new institutions of comparable quality could be
created solely to handle corporate trust functions. Thus the cost of independent trusteeships may be greater than investors are willing to pay.
There is, however, another method of dealing with misuse of inside information through the imposition of additional disclosure requirements
upon obligors. The effect of disclosure requirements extends beyond the
situation in which a financial institution acts as a corporate trustee. Indeed,
the major interest in such requirements has been prompted by problems
wholly outside of the realm of corporate trusteeships. Most of the suggestions for increased disclosure are directed primarily at the potential
misuse, by bank trust departments, of information received by the bank
through its commercial operations.' 5 9 While disclosure may be necessary in lending and interlocking directorate situations, any additional
requirements also ought to take account of the problem of the misuse of
information acquired by banks as corporate trustees under an indenture.
The President's Commission on Financial Structure & Regulation' 6"
has recommended that trust institutions be required annually to report
(a) their twenty largest stock holdings; (b) holdings constituting 5 percent
or more of a corporation's voting stock; (c) interlocks of officers, directors,
or senior employees between trust institutions and portfolio companies;
and (d) cases in which its shares were voted in opposition to management
of portfolio companies.' 6' These proposals do not go far enough, since
they do not distinguish cases of potential conflict of interest from those in
which inside information was probably misused. In order to identify possible misuses of inside information, a trust institution should be required
to disclose sales of substantial percentages' 62 of its holdings of the securities of any corporation to which it has made direct loans, with which it
has executive interlocks, or for which it serves as indenture trustee. Reports should be made within a short time after the occurrence of any
such transaction and should be filed with the SEC, so that those who pur158 See notes 79-82 and accompanying text supra; cf. J. KENNEDY, supra note 53,
at 54.
159 See Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Activities: Seven Gaps,
Eight Remedies, 90 BANKING L. J. 912, 914-15, 923-27 (1973). Lybecker recognizes
that potential conflicts may also exist when the bank's trust department holds a corporation's stock and still carries on other banking relationships with the corporation.
For Lybecker's allusion to the conflict posed when the bank is an indenture trustee,
see id. at 925.
160 The Commission was to "review and study the structure, operation, and regulation of the private financial institutions in the United States, for the purpose of
formulating recommendations that would improve the functioning of the private
financial system." REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON FINANCIAL STRUCTURE
AND REGULATION, supra note 16, at I.
161 Id. at 102.
162 It would not be unreasonable to require reporting of sales of 10 percent of the
bank trust department's holdings of a particular corporation. Note that the important
figure is the percentage of the bank's holdings, regardless of the relation of this figure
to the total outstanding shares of the corporation.
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chased the securities may be alterted to the possibility that a seller may
have had inside information. In addition, where the institution is an indenture trustee, reports of large-scale sell offs should be transmitted
promptly to indenture security holders, along with a statement explaining
why the sales were made. Only in this way will indenture security holders
be alerted to potential business problems that have been discovered by
the -trustee. Even if the information in the trustee's explanatory statement
falls short of extablishing any breach of the indenture covenants, -it is im portant information for debt security holders since it will alert them to
watch future events carefully.
Mandatory reporting by trustees to indenture security holders might
require amendment of the Trust Indenture Act as it presently stands.
Section 315(b) 163 permits the indenture to provide that, in case of default other than in payment of principal, interest, or sinking fund, the
directors, executive committee, or responsible trust committee of the trustee may withhold notice of the default from indenture security holders if
they determine in good faith that such action is in the interest of such
holders. The difficulties encountered in showing a lack of good faith make
the possibility of an institution's wrongfully withholding notice, in order to
benefit its creditor or portfolio management activities, a real danger. Mandatory disclosure, even in situations short of default, would give protection to the indenture security holders. The disclosures, in all likelihood,
would outweigh any benefit derived through the withholding of information in the rare case contemplated by Section 315(b).1 64
B. The Trustee-Lender's Rights
In 1939, Congress decided to permit trustees of a corporation's debt
securities to carry on normal commercial banking relationships with obligor corporations. 165 The trustee was permitted to continue to collect its
direct loans upon the obligor's default on any covenant, other than default
in the payment of principal or interest. 166 Where a default in payment
of principal or interest occurred, although the lender-trustee could completely retain all payments received four or more months before the default, it was required to share any payments received thereafter on a pro
16 7
rata basis with indenture security holders.
Because numerous covenants are usually included in the indenture as
early warning devices, the trustee is likely to have notice of financial difficulties well before default in the payment of principal or interest. This
knowledge will enable the trustee to step up loan collection efforts before
15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(b) (1970).
Occasions upon which withholding of information would be beneficial to indenture securities owners are not easy to imagine. Although the occurrence of a
minor, technical default can be envisioned, the better rule would be to require full
disclosure. Withholding of material information from those trading in the obligor's
securities presumably would violate rule lOb-5.
163
164

165 See notes 76-82 and accompanying text supra.
166
167

Trust Indenture Act § 311 (a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77kkk(a)(l) (1970).
Trust Indenture Act § 311, 15 U.S.C. § 77kkk (1970).
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the four month cut-off. If the trustee is to be permitted to maintain lending relationships with the obligor on the debt securities, the trustee's duties
should be increased. First, and at the very least, the provisions of Section
311 of the Act, 168 which prohibit the preferential collection of claims by
the lender-trustee only upon default in the payment of principal or interest, ought to be triggered by any default.'" 9 Revamping of the trustee's
duties, however, should go even further. Once a default of any kind has
occurred, the trustee should be required to place the interest of indenture
security holders ahead of itF own interests. To the extent that holders of
indenture securities have a claim on assets equal to that of the lendertrustee (i.e., to the extent the indenture securities are not specifically subordinated to creditors of the same class as the lender-trustee), all assets
coming into the hands of the trustee should go first to cover the claims of
the indenture security holders. Where a loan by its terms is secured by a
lien on the borrower's property, and was so secured before the lender
had reason to believe that a default on the indenture securities was likely
to occur, it is fair to give the lender-trustee a prior claim to that property.
If the secured loan antedated the issuance of the indenture securities,
purchasers of these securities would have had notice of the loan in the
registration statement of the issuer. Even if -the loan was extended while
the indenture securities were outstanding, the pledging of collateral presumably resulted in a lower interest rate or other favorable terms to the
borrower; all of these favorable terms would inure to the benefit of all
security holders. But no such quid pro quo is generally given in exchange
for the lien that arises by operation of law on particular assets of the
debtor. To the extent that compensating balance arrangements are intended to secure repayment of a loan, and thus result in lower interest
rates or other favorable terms, the same considerations applicable to security arrangements would apply. It is necessary under this proposal,
therefore, that the role of the compensating balance arrangement be made
clear in the loan agreement. At present, it seems likely that many compensating balance arrangements are intended solely as indirect methods
70
If
of increasing the effective rate of interest on the borrower's loan.
the lender wishes to secure repayment by immobilizing cash reserves of
the borrower, the traditional sinking fund is a more effective device for
accomplishing this objective.
Thus, under this proposal, the lender-trustee could realize upon any
collateral covered by its loan agreement, but not upon other assets to
which, by operation of law, the lender-trustee might ordinarily have first
claim, e.g., assets reachable through rights of setoff or through the existence of a banker's lien. All assets, including compensating balances,
which are not specifically encumbered in the lender-trustee's agreement
15 U.S.C. § 77kkk (1970).
This requirement can be extended to prohibiting preferential collection upon
the occurrence of any "event of default." See note 101 and accompanying text supra,
and notes 174-75 and accompanying text infra.
170 See note 93 and accompanying text supra.
168

169
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with the borrower, would go to the indenture security holders. 171 These
assets should probably include not only assets acquired within four
months before default and after default, but also those which came into
the lender-trustee's control at any time the trustee had reason to believe
that a default was likely to occur. The proposed operating procedures and
priorities would elevate the actions of the trustee to a standard commensurate with his title.
C. Activating the Passive Trustee
The failure of trustees to promptly discover defaults is a significant
172
problem, particularly as indenture covenants become more complex.
Several converging institutional practices discourage the prompt discovery
of defaults, and the Trust Indenture Act establishes standards which make
such discovery difficult.
First, the Act does not require independent verification of an obligor's
compliance with many types of indenture covenants. An annual review by
independent certified public accountants, in order to determine whether
there has been a breach of any of the indenture covenants, is needed to
give adequate protection to the indenture security holders. The SEC has
authority under Section 314(a)173 of the Act to require the issuer of the
debt securities to file an audit of this sort with the Commission and the
trustee.
Second, the Act should require the trustee to exercise the same degree
of care and skill in discovering the existence of a default as a prudent
man would exercise in the conduct of his own affairs. This could be accomplished most easily by amending Section 315,174 which now differentiates between the predefault and postdefault duties of the trustee. Instead of permitting the activation of the trustee to depend entirely upon
the indenture definition of default, the section should be recast to impose
the higher standard of care upon the occurrence of any "event of default, ' 175 even if a notice requirement or a grace period has not turned
the event into a "default." Thus, while the indenture may still include
whatever covenants are desired, the occurrence of events which, except
for a grace period, notice requirement, or similar formality, would constitute a default, will impose new duties upon the trustee. Holding the
trustee responsible for taking action when such events occur, will cause
it to take extra steps to discover defaults. A defense of reasonable reliance
upon certificates of compliance issued by independent certified public accountants would alleviate any unfairness and would give adequate pro171 While this proposal might lead to encumbering an obligor's assets to a greater
extent by creditors, these security arrangements would be disclosed, and holders of
securities under the indenture would be more likely to be aware of these arrangements.
172 See notes 108-26 and accompanying text supra.
173 15 U.S.C. § 77nnn(a) (1970).
174 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo (1970).
175 See note 101 and accompanying text supra.
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tection to the trustee in cases of collusion or fraud by the issuer and the
issuer's accountants. These proposals would do much to improve the protection given to indenture security holders.

III. CONCLUSION
While Congress generally has updated the other federal securities statutes as changing business p':actices have required statutory modifications,
it has studiously avoided the complex Trust Indenture Act. Now the time
for a review of this Act has arrived as well. The drafting of the Federal
Securities Code by the American Law Institute presents an opportunity
to rethink some of the provisions of the Trust Indenture Act, in terms
of both the protections afforded to debt security holders, and the relationship of the Act's provisions to other public policies. Congressional
hearings or empirical investigations of corporate trust operations may reveal problems beyond those suggested by this article. Whatever may have
been the rationale in the past, the Trust Indenture Act can no longer
justifiably be ignored.

